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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: WHY
CONGRESS SHOULD TREAD LIGHTLY WHEN
ENTERING THE FIELD OF FAMILY LAW
Elizabeth G. Patterson*
INTRODUCTION

In the last thirty-five years Congress has become increasingly
willing to legislate directly on matters related to families, though
these traditionally have been regarded as primarily, if not exclusively,
state concerns. Just in the most recent two-year session of Congress,
numerous bills were introduced that directly addressed issues of
family law and policy. In addition to the highly publicized Marriage
Protection Amendment (Marriage Amendment), a proposal to amend
the Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage,' bills were introduced
regarding promotion of responsible fatherhood,2 paid family medical
leave,3 protective programs for abused adults,4 parental notification
when contraceptives are provided to minors,5 and protection for
6
breast feeding mothers, among other things.
During debate on an earlier version of the Marriage Amendment,
some senators expressed concern about that effort to federally
mandate a particular approach to family law. 7 Their statements
* Professor of Law at the University of South Carolina School of Law and former State Director of
the South Carolina Department of Social Services. Prior to attending law school, she worked with the
Head Start program and with poverty programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
1. Marriage Protection Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 89, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008); Marriage Protection
Amendment, SJ. Res. 43, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008); see Aaron Leichman, Federal MarriageAmendment Reintroduced
in
Senate,
CHRISTIAN
POST,
July
2,
2008,
available
at
http./www.chisfanpposom/aricle/20080702/federal-marriage-amendment-r-introduced-in-senate.htm.
2. Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007, S. Res. 1626, 110th Cong. § 101
(2007).
3. Healthy Family Act, H.R. Res. 1542, 110th Cong. § 3(1) (2007).
4. Elder Justice Act, H.R. Res. 1783, 110th Cong. § 102(a) (2007).
5. Parent's Right to Know Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 2134, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007).
6. Breastfeeding Promotion Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 2236, 110th Cong. § 101(b)(2) (2007). This list
is exemplary only, and does not include all bills introduced during the 110th Congress that directly
address family law and policy. Further, many bills contain provisions that affect family law and policy
although the primary objective of the bill lies elsewhere.
7. See, e.g., Craig Broffman and Ed Henry, McCain: Same-sex Marriage Ban is Un-Republican
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reflected a longstanding recognition throughout American
government that family issues, with their heavy infusion of local
norms, can be coherently dealt with only at the local level. The onesize-fits-all approach of federal rule-making cannot accommodate the
cultural variations of a nation of 296 million persons 8 with different
histories, religions, and national backgrounds. Thus, of all areas
traditionally allocated to state control, family law evokes the
strongest localist sentiment from both state and federal officials. The
Supreme Court's statement in the 1979 case of Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo sums up the prevailing posture: "The whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
9
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States."
Despite these avowals and admonitions, Congress has in the last
fifty years shown an increasing willingness to involve itself in family
law matters, not only as a facilitator and supporter of state initiatives,
but also as a rule-maker in its own right. The Constitution does not
authorize Congress to legislate on family matters. However, using its
authority to condition the receipt of federal funds, Congress has
exercised a quasi-regulatory authority to shape a broad array of
family law rules. 10 Major federal enactments in the areas of child
abuse, 1 adoption, 12 child support, 13 paternity establishment, 14 and
(July 14, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/14/Mccain.marriage/;
Log Cabin
Republicans,
GOP
Opposition
to
the
Federal
Marriage
Amendment,
http://www.logcabin.org/logcabin/flnaquotesGOPsenators.html (last visited July 21, 2008); Susan
Milligan, Granite State's Sununu Often Goes Against GOP, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2004, availableat
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/07/18/granite-statessununu_ often goesagainstgop
_grain/.
8. U.S. POPClock Projection, www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html (last visited July

18, 2008).
9. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890)).
10. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text for discussion of the evolution of congressional
authority under the Spending Clause.
11. E.g., Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (AFSA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2116
(1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)); Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
(AACWA), Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79(a));
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2000).
12. E.g., Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997; Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980; Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2000)
(transracial adoption).
13. E.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988); Personal
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marriage' 5 have significantly affected the rules and policy directions
of family law. 16
Some federal activity in the family law realm is unavoidable and
even desirable. Federal legislation on issues such as the foregoing
brings needed attention and resources to bear on serious social
problems affecting families. Moreover, social problems that exist
separately in families and communities throughout the nation can
become so pervasive or interconnected as to require a nationwide
response or can begin to affect issues of national concern such as
economic stability or military readiness. In cases such as these,
federal attention to the relevant family issue is both understandable
and desirable.
The federal attention can become pernicious, however, if federal
program requirements demand changes in state law that could disrupt
the fabric of family law and policy in a state. Because family policy
is closely connected to community norms and local social cohesion,
such disruptions can have deleterious social effects that were neither
anticipated nor desired by Congress. These disruptions can be, and
sometimes are, avoided by a less prescriptive federal approach that
allows states to achieve legislative objectives in a manner consistent
with local family policy. 17
Federal program mandates also can become counterproductive if
they stifle state creativity in fashioning solutions to complex and
multifaceted social problems such as child abuse and the economics

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
14. E.g., Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
15. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
16. Federal courts also have been active in the family law arena, and have been the source of some
of the most controversial federal family law rules. See, e.g., Janet Dolgin, The Constitution as Family
Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 337 (2002); Developments in the Law-The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1980). Judicially created rules, while beyond the
scope of this article, raise many of the same issues discussed herein.
17. For instance, the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), which requires a
system of reporting and investigating child abuse and neglect, allows the states to define what
constitutes child abuse and neglect. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2000). Similarly, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which requires states to have numerical
guidelines for determining the amount of a noncustodial parent's child support obligation, allows the
states to determine the formula to be used. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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of divided families. Just at the moment that Congress provides states
with the impetus, the resources, and the guidance to attack thorny
social problems within their borders, it often deprives them of
flexibility to experiment with potentially viable approaches to
addressing them.
Although the federal government possesses the power to legislate
broadly in the family law area, it should exercise this power sparingly
and carefully to avoid disrupting the integrated body of each state's
family law. This article will begin with an overview of federal power
under the Constitution's Spending Clause, which has opened the door
to federal family law enactments. It will then discuss the basis for the
tradition of federal deference to the states in this area, demonstrating
that local control of family law continues to play an important role in
maintaining the social fabric and protecting individual autonomy and
community health. This will be followed by an exploration of how
the structures and processes of Congress limit its competence to
legislate effectively in regard to matters affecting family law and
policy. Two examples from federal child support enforcement
legislation will illustrate the unintended effects on families and
family policy that can result from these limitations. The article
concludes with a cautionary note about the potential costs of
piecemeal tinkering with family policy by ill-informed federal
lawmakers.
I. STATE DOMINANCE IN THE FAMILY LAW AREA

A.

The Tradition of FederalDeference

Federal deference to the states in the area of family law is evident
in both case law and practice going back at least to the midnineteenth century.' 8 Even in an era when federal power was viewed
as generally circumscribed, the degree of restraint exercised in regard
to family law was notable. For instance, the Supreme Court, without
bothering to give a reason, carved out of federal courts' diversity
18. E.g., Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1859).
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jurisdiction an exception for all domestic relations matters. 19 In recent
years, when the Court has sanctioned expansions in the scope of
federal authority that seem virtually limitless, 20 it continues to single
out family law as an area in which state authority should dominate. 21
Nonetheless, its expansive view of the constitutional prerogatives of
Congress has opened the door to an increasing federal presence in

family law and policy.
1. Growth of FederalPower to MandateFamily Law Rules
Because the Constitution gives Congress no express authority to
legislate in the family sphere, any authority it has in this area must be
derived from its power to collect taxes and expend revenues "for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... "2
For almost 150 years after the Constitution was ratified, it remained
unclear whether this clause authorized congressional spending

outside the areas of authority enumerated elsewhere in the
Constitution. 23 This question was resolved by the Supreme Court's
1936 decision in United States v. Butler,24 holding that the provision
authorized spending for any aspect of the general welfare. Under
Butler, however, a federal spending measure would nonetheless be
unconstitutional if it intruded into the realm of authority reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment, 25 including family law.
Subsequent to Butler, the breadth of Congress's spending power
and the judicial deference to it have expanded, and the strength of the
Tenth Amendment limitation has diminished. One product of this
evolution has been a broad expansion of the types of conditions that
19. Barber, 136 U.S. at 584; see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992).
20. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
21. The Court continues to recognize the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction;
applies strict scrutiny in preemption cases involving state family law enactments; and otherwise gives
state sovereignty particular deference in the area of family law. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. 689;
Hisquierdo v.Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
22. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
1.
23. The debate went back to a dispute between James Madison, who advocated the narrower position
that Congress could tax and spend only in furtherance of its enumerated powers, and Alexander
Hamilton, who argued for the broader federal power. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
24. Id.
25. Id.at 68-70.
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can be attached to federal grants to the states. Butler had recognized
Congress's authority to condition receipt of federal funds on
adherence to conditions meant to assure that the funds were being
26
spent to accomplish the objective of the federal spending program.
The Supreme Court gradually expanded the power to condition to a
point at which it virtually eclipsed contrary Tenth Amendment
considerations. In the 1987 case of South Dakota v. Dole, the Court
upheld congressional conditions that were at best only indirectly
related to the purpose of the federal spending program.27 A parallel
development was a dramatic decline in the Court's discussion of
whether the "welfare" sought to be furthered through a federal
spending program was national rather than local, as deference to
28
Congress in this area had become virtually conclusive.
The spending power, as thus interpreted, allows Congress to create
rules and programs in any policy area so long as they are framed as
conditions on receipt of federal funds. Moreover, the power can be
exercised in ways that limit state autonomy and that utilize state
powers and institutions to serve ends determined at the federal rather
than the state level.
2. Current Validity of the Rationalesfor FederalDeference
The reasons for singling out family law for special treatment in the
federal system were never clearly articulated in the primary legal
sources. 2 9 In a 1930 opinion, Justice Holmes suggested that state
26. Id. at 73. Butler involved grants to private entities; however, the following year the Court applied
the same principle in a case where the grantees on which conditions were imposed were states. Charles
C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-98 (1937).
27. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Dole involved a provision conditioning the receipt of federal highway
funds on enactment of state legislation establishing twenty-one as the minimum age at which alcoholic
beverages could be legally consumed. Justice O'Connor's dissent noted the tenuous relationship
between the condition and the objectives of the federal spending program. Id. at 213-18.
28. Compare Charles C. StewardMach. Co., 301 U.S. at 586-87, andHelvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 640-42 (1937), with Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
29. In a 1992 opinion recognizing the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction,
the Court pointed to the existence of specialized expertise and institutions at the state level as the reason
for avoiding federal involvement in family issues. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04
(1992). A dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist in an earlier case attributed federal deference
regarding family law to the importance of allowing states room to experiment with innovative responses
to complex problems. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770-73 (1982).
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control of the domestic relations between husband and wife and
between parent and child is simply derived from the common
understanding at the time the Constitution was adopted. 30 Although
Holmes may have been referring to common understandings related
to the federal system, it is reasonable to suppose that the common
understandings to which he alluded also related to the
interdependence of families and their local communities, and their
combined role in creating and maintaining the social fabric upon
which liberty and order depend.
B. Communities, Families, and the Social Order
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of family
as a building block of society. In case after case, the Court has
protected parental prerogatives, stating that parents have a duty, 3as
1
well as a right, to prepare children for the obligations of adulthood.

1. The IndividualInterest in Family
The family is not, however, a mere convenience of the state,
protected because of its child-rearing role. It also has profound
importance to the individuals of which it is comprised. Matters of
choice in marriage and family life are considered a vital aspect of
constitutional liberty.32 It is within the family that the essential

Neither of these is an adequate explanation for the deep and time-honored federal reluctance to
enter the family law arena. Justice Rehnquist's experimentation rationale is too broad to explain the
extraordinary deference in the area of family law, as it is equally applicable to many other areas of law.
The existence of state expertise and institutions cannot explain the thinking that gave rise to those very
institutions and expertise.
30. Ohio er rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930). On this basis, the Court held that
constitutional provisions requiring that all proceedings against ambassadors and other representatives of
foreign countries be heard in federal and not state courts was inapplicable to a suit for divorce and
alimony. Id
31. E.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
32. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See generally Elizabeth G. Patterson, Health Care Choice and the
Constitution:Reconciling Privacyand Public Health, 42 RuTGERS L. REv. 1,9-22 (1989).
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identity of the individual is formed and where it finds its clearest
expression. The importance of family to the individual was
underlined by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey:
"Our precedents 'have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.' These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
are central to the
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
33
Amendment.
liberty protected by the Fourteenth
2. The Community Interest in Family
Neither the individual nor the collective interest in families can be
fully realized separate and apart from the surrounding community.
Families exist within and receive support and structure from their
local communities. In many ways, healthy communities function as
extended families-participating in the education and upbringing of
children, marking and supporting family milestones such as birth,
marriage, and death, and enhancing family functioning through
informal sanctions based on shared norms and values. Protection of
the individual and societal interests in family thus radiates beyond the
family itself to encompass the community which nurtures and
supports the family. Under this analysis, federal deference to the
states in the area of family law rests on recognition that families and
family functioning are critical to the social and moral health of
communities and thus should be determined at the local level.34
There is thus a symbiotic relationship among individuals, families,
and communities. Together, they produce a system of norms and
institutions that supports the aspirations of individuals and their
families and instills community values in the next generation. This
"social fabric" is not uniform among communities. The size of each
community, its religious traditions, geographical location, economic
structure, and countless other variables, create in each community its
33. 508 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (1944)); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34. For an extended discussion of the communitarian basis for deference to state sovereignty over
family law, see Anne C. Dailey, Federalismand Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
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own distinct culture. 35 Between and among communities with many
divergent characteristics, the cultural differences can be dramatic. As
a result, their social structures and norms relating to families are
similarly diverse.
3. Families and Social Capital
The community as a whole has its own stake in preserving the
norms and practices that shape and support family life, which
transcends the value of families as socializers of the next generation.
A variety of desirable social indicators-such as school quality,
economic growth, and low crime rates-are correlated with the
existence of what modem scholars label "social capital. 36 The term
"social capital" refers to aspects of social organization such as
networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation
for mutual benefit. 37 Social capital is enhanced by strong families,
whose members participate in community institutions, networks, and
other aspects of social organization.
An important ingredient of social capital is community members'
sense of control over important aspects of the physical, social, and
moral environment of the community. 38 Control of issues important
to community life by national legislative bodies can be detrimental to
social capital both because members of the community feel powerless
to shape laws crafted at the national level, and because nationally
adopted rules may be inconsistent with the normative structure that
forms the foundation for community life.
35. See, e.g., Thaddeus Coreno, Fundamentalism as a Class Culture, 63 SOC. OF RELIGION 335,
342-45 (Fall 2002); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy"
Law: An Essay on the Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 107-08
(1988); David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1, 2001, at 6063.
36. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearanceof Social
Capital in America, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 664 (1995); see also Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive
Community: A CommunitarianPerspective 1995 PresidentialAddress, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 1, 4-5 (1996);
Joshua Miller, Family and Community Integrity, 28 J. OF SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 23, 28, (Dec. 2001);
David J. Wood, Let's Meet: RebuildingCommunity, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 10, 2004, at 1.
37. Robert D. Putnam, The prosperous community, social capital and public life, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT
13
(1993),
available
at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article-the_prosperous-community.
38. Miller, supra note 36, at 28.
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4. The Importance of Legal Diversity Among Communities

Local dominance in setting family policy protects individual
choice in another way as well, by creating legal diversity within the
federal system concerning family issues. When uniform national
family laws are adopted, persons who find the laws inconsistent with
their personal beliefs and aspirations have no choice but to comply.
Leaving family law to the states, however, allows diversity to exist
within the United States, and individuals whose values differ from
those of the majority in one location have the alternative of

emigrating to another, more compatible, community. 39 Thus, legal
diversity among the states "increase[s] aggregate social welfare...
[by] accommodat[ing] the [moral] preferences of a greater proportion
of the [citizenry]." 4
C. Community Values in the Supreme Court
The diversity of communities throughout the United States makes
it inevitable that nationally adopted rules will fail to capture local
norms and practices. A nationally adopted rule on a matter heavily
affected by cultural variables has significant potential for a disruptive
impact on the normative structures of at least some communities.4 '

The notion that issues strongly connected with upholding
community value systems should be determined at the local level

appears regularly in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court's
obscenity cases provide a prominent example. Stating that a primary
39. Dailey, supra note 34, at 1871-72; see Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 66, 72 (2001). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under
Federalism, 55 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992). This concept could have influenced
recognition/creation of a constitutional right to interstate migration, though it is not explicitly discussed
in the Court's seminal opinions on the issue. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). These cases struck down state laws aimed at
discouraging persons from migrating to the state to take advantage of its laws.
40. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 47172 (2003); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1484, 1494 (1987).
41. See Schneider supra note 35, at 113; Mark Regnerus et al., Voting with the Christian Right:
Contextual and Individual Patterns of Electoral Influence, 77 SOC. FORCES 1375, 1380, 1392 (June
1999).
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purpose of obscenity regulation is protection of the environment and
quality of life of the community, 42 the Court has grounded its
definition of "obscenity" in the values of the local community. 43 The
Court explicitly recognized the right of the people of Maine or
Mississippi to conclude that the social fabric of their community was
debased by public display of certain explicit conduct, even though the
people of Las Vegas or New York City did not regard the same
display as objectionable.44 Supreme Court deference to community
values on issues heavily laden with moral values is also visible in
areas such as education law and criminal law and procedure. In
reaffirming state and local primacy in matters relating to public
education, the Court has emphasized the role of public schools in
transmitting community values. 45 Similarly, in defining and
protecting the role of the jury, the Court often speaks of the jury's
role in assuring that community values are reflected in making
46
determinations regarding criminal guilt and sentencing.
The public and judicial focus on individual liberties in the last part
of the twentieth century led some to question whether the Court
remained committed to protecting community values and recognizing
the legitimacy of state laws based on community conceptions of
morality.47 This trend was most fully realized in the Supreme Court's
2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, striking down state prohibitions
of homosexual sodomy, where the Court made clear that majoritarian

42. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1973).
43. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33-35 (1972) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200
(1964) (Warren, J., dissenting)).
44. See ParisAdult Theatre1, 413 U.S. at 57-63; Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33.
45. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (noting a "substantial community interest in
promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral or political").
46. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
596 (1997)); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 474-76,483-90.
47. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justificationsfor Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1254-58 (2004); see also Carl E. Schneider, Moral
Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985)
(documenting decreased discourse concerning morality in American judicial and statutory law

concerning the family).
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perceptions of moral behavior cannot justify legal incursions upon
individual liberty.48
Lawrence was seen by many, including Justice Scalia, as
delegitimizing all state laws based on moral choices. 49 However,
Lawrence did not speak to state laws advancing public morality, as
contrasted to state laws enforcing majoritarian conceptions of private
morality. 50 Protection of the social fabric of communities, which
implicates public rather than private morality, remains a vital governmental interest.
Furthermore, Lawrence's emphasis on individual rights is
consistent with its parallel interest in community values. Individual
community members' constitutionally protected choices concerning
marriage and family life are themselves the source of and are
supported by the social fabric of their communities. Nonconformists
whose choices lie outside community norms are protected by the
diversity of social norms and legal rules throughout the United States.
Thus, the increased emphasis on individual rights does not negate the
policies that support local control of family law. Rather, the
traditional rationales continue to call for local control of the broad
range of laws that structure family relationships and define the rights
and duties of family members.
II. FEDERAL POLICY INITIATIVES AFFECTING FAMILY LAW
Congress has shown no interest in a broad takeover of family law
and continues to express deference to the states in this area. However,
the expansion of its power under the Spending Clause invites direct
federal involvement in family law areas whenever fiscal, political, or
other federal concerns lead in this direction. 51 Federal law on child
48. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Court held that the prohibition of homosexual
sodomy "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual." Id. at 578.
49. Id. at 586-606 (Scalia, J., Dissenting).
50. Devaluation of the states' interests in controlling private morality does limit the scope of state
rulemaking regarding family matters. For instance, it may provide the basis for rejecting state authority
to limit marriage to persons of different sexes. Id. at 577.
51. Congress generally avoids direct involvement in family law except where pursuit of a federal
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support enforcement, for instance, is an outgrowth of congressional
concern about spiraling costs of the federally funded welfare
program.
When congressional legislation reaches into the realm of family
and social issues, a too-narrow focus on federal policy objectives
tends to prevent careful examination and understanding of the effect
that federal proposals may have on the cohesive bodies of family law
that have evolved in each of the states. The displacement of state
authority in affected areas of family law is not mitigated by its being
merely a side-effect of the pursuit of federal policy goals. Indeed, the
very fact that Congress's objective is peripheral to the main body of
family law and policy increases the potential that its mandates will
disrupt the integrity of the body of state family law.
Some federal family law proposals, such as the constitutional
amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage, are controversial even at
the conceptual level. The objectives of other federal family law
enactments such as child support enforcement and child abuse
prevention are widely applauded and are generally shared by policymakers at both state and federal levels. 52 However, even as to these,
federal execution of the shared objectives, both in the legislative
details and in the administrative oversight, has sometimes been
artless, leading to significant costs in the quality of the resulting
policy.53 Unintended effects are prevalent, and corrective
modifications are difficult at the federal level.
Problems of this sort are inevitable when federal legislation sets
rules of family law and process and nationalizes specific family
policy concepts. The problems that arise when Congress legislates in
the family law arena arise precisely because family issues will always

objective can be enhanced by a particular approach to a family law issue. A possible exception is the
federal legislation concerning child abuse and neglect, which was addressed by Congress on its own
merits without a federal policy "hook." See BARBARA J. NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE:
POLITICAL AGENDA SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 76 (1984).
52. State legislation regarding both child support and child abuse was widespread prior to
Congress's entry into the field.
53. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(potential for considerable disagreement as to how best to accomplish a goal despite general agreement
about the goal itself).
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remain inherently local in nature, and the expertise and institutions
necessary for addressing them do not and cannot exist at the federal
level.
III. STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL FACTORS THAT LIMIT THE
QUALITY OF CONGRESSIONALLY CREATED FAMILY LAW

The framers of the Constitution drew a sharp distinction between
local concerns, which would continue to be the province of the states,
and national issues, which were delegated to the federal government.
Issues affecting individual persons, such as crime, family law, and
education, are prototypical examples of the local issues that were to
remain the domain of the states. 54 The enumerated powers that were
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution were related
to collective national issues: those affecting the nation as a whole
(such as foreign affairs), those involving relations among states
(interstate commerce), and those which transcended state borders
(such as promotion of scientific advancement).
With the recent judicial expansion of the realms of federal
authority, it is now difficult to delineate any area in which the federal
government is totally uninvolved. However, the interests and
structures of each level of government, and hence their competencies,
continue in significant ways to reflect the original understanding of
the roles of federal and state governments. Consequently, members of
Congress often are not familiar with or sensitive to local policy areas
that may be affected by federal enactments. This is particularly true
in an area such as family law which has so adamantly been regarded
as an exclusive state province.
Thus, it is not only the inherent difficulty of developing national
rules in areas overlain with diverse local cultures that militates
against congressional adoption of family law rules. Congress and the
state legislatures look at issues through different lenses. Although the
legislative processes in Congress and the state legislatures are
54. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65
(1995); THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
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structurally similar, statutes that emerge from the process in
Washington tend to differ in important ways from statutes on the
same subject that emerge from a state legislative process. The
historical difference in the roles of state and federal governments in
the American system of government is only one source of these
different perspectives. A number of practical differences in the
circumstances and context of each law-making process contribute to
differences in the legislative product of each body.
A. Lack of Structureand Expertise in Congress ConcerningFamily
Law
A fundamental handicap to congressional competence in the family
law arena is its own structure and its lack of internal expertise on
issues of traditional state concern. Expertise in any legislative body is
closely linked to committee structure, as committees and
subcommittees form the infrastructure for most significant legislative
activity. All legislative bodies are organized into committees with
jurisdiction over specific subject areas, and most committees are
divided into subcommittees which are even more specialized. Within
their areas of jurisdiction, these committees and subcommittees hold
hearings, develop proposed legislation, provide detailed scrutiny of
each bill and determine whether the bill should be referred to the full
House or Senate and in what form. It is the committee or
subcommittee that has the greatest impact on the substance of any bill
that becomes law, and, indeed, on the decision whether Congress
should legislate at all on a particular subject. 55 In order to carry out
these functions, and as a result of carrying them out, both members
and staff of a particular committee or subcommittee develop
considerable expertise in the areas of committee or subcommittee
jurisdiction.56

55. See Lawrence Mead, The Politics of Conservative Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF
WELFARE 201,214 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds. 2001).
56. See, e.g., EDWARD SCHNEIER & BERTRAM GROSS, LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY 79-83 (1993);
Robert Zwier, The Search for Information: Specialists and Nonspecialists in the U.S. House of
Representatives,IV LEGIS. STUD. Q. 31 (1979).
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All state legislatures designate a particular committee to manage
the numerous bills relating to family law that are introduced in every
state during each legislative session. Normally this is the Judiciary
Committee, since family law constitutes a large portion of the
business of state courts. The primary committee in turn often creates
one or more subcommittees specializing in family law. This structure
produces a cadre of legislators and staff with a broad awareness of
the many interlinking family issues, including divorce, child custody,
child support enforcement, paternity establishment, parental rights,
adoption, and child abuse. These internal experts are relied on by
other legislators to evaluate new initiatives and assure that any new
policies are integrated into a coherent body of family law.
The committee structures of the United States House and Senate,
on the other hand, are dominated by traditional federal concerns.
Areas within the traditional jurisdiction of the states generally lack
their own committees, and rarely have their own subcommittees,
despite recent federal legislative action relating to those areas. No
congressional committee has jurisdiction over family law as such.
Since federal courts do not hear family law cases, jurisdiction of the
Judiciary Committees in Congress does not encompass this area.
Matters relating to family law and family policy are considered by
several different committees, depending on how the issue is
perceived and the context in which it arose. For instance, the welfare
reform bill, which required many specific changes in state child
support law, was handled by the House Ways & Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee, both of which are primarily
concerned with federal fiscal issues. 57 Neither of these Committees
had any particular expertise in identification of parents, family
economics, or the intersection of these matters with other aspects of
family policy. Their jurisdiction of the bill arose from the primarily
fiscal character of the traditional welfare program as viewed from the
federal perspective.

57. Mead, supra note 55, at 210-11. Mead notes that these committees' power and control of tax and
budget issues has enabled them to make changes in the AFDC program with little detailed scrutiny by
Congress as a whole. Id.
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B. Limitations on External Sources of Expertise
Congress's limited internal expertise on family law issues could be
remedied to some extent if Congress had ready access to adequate
information from external sources. Indeed, both elected
representatives and congressional staff do have a variety of excellent
sources of information. Reform efforts during the 1970s created
several sources of expertise and information for Congress, including
the Office of Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget
Office, and the Congressional Research Service. 58 These entities
serve as sources of perspectives, ideas, and information on a variety
of policy issues, including issues of family policy. 59 The problem
with this information is not its quality, but rather its focus, as these
entities were created to provide Congress with information deemed
relevant at the national, rather than the local level. 60 Hence, these
entities tend to focus on the discrete areas of family law that have
drawn federal attention, but do not generally develop a nuanced
understanding of family law and policy as a whole.
The concerns of national advocacy organizations and think tanks,
another source of expert information for Congress, tend to be similar
to those of congressional members and staff, and hence the subjects
of their studies and reports are similarly focused. The same is true of
federal agencies. This is not surprising, since both federal agencies
and national advocacy organizations are part of the policy networks
that regularly interact with congressional members and staff to frame
issues for congressional action. 6 ' Consequently, they have similar
58. Bruce Bimber, Information as a Factor in CongressionalPolitics,XVI LEGIS.
(1991).

STUD.

Q. 585, 586

59. But note that a 1979 survey of legislators found that few regarded the Congressional Research
Service and General Accounting Office as important sources of information. Zwier, supra note 56, at
39-40.
60. See Norman Beckman, CongressionalInformation Processesfor National Policy, ANNALS OF
THE Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC., Mar. 1971, at 84, 93. A particular impetus for Congress's creation of
these internal sources of expert information was to equalize the informational capacity and expertise of
Congress with that of the executive branch. The 1970's were a time of sharp clashes between the
Democratic Congress and the Nixon administration. Bimber, supra note 58, at 589.
61. See SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 56, at 80-83; Zwier, supra note 56, at 37-38 (legislators'
reliance on program staff for technical information); Jeffrey M. Berry, Citizen Groupsand the Changing
Nature of Interest Group Politics in America, ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. SC., JULY
1993, at 30, 34-37. Issue networks are loose agglomerations of individuals who share an interest in a
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views of what issues are proper subjects for study and reporting. All
tend to focus on the national issues at which federal action is targeted
rather than collateral issues of state and local concern, including the
broad range of family laws and policies that may be implicated by the
federal initiative. Information concerning diverse local conditions and
norms falls outside the expertise, if not the interest, of the typical
policy network.
C. Obstacles to CongressionalAccess to Local Information
1. The Significance of Local Information
Limitations on the availability of local information to legislators
and to the legislative process are tolerable in regard to inherently
national issues. The facts and circumstances which underlie policy
decisions on these issues are not subject to local variation. With
regard to the war in Iraq, for instance, it is important for each
representative to know his constituents' views, but the
representative's understanding of the issue and how it affects his or
her constituents is not dependent on communication from those
constituents themselves.
The situation is very different when Congress legislates in regard
to family issues. In 1996, for instance, Congress considered and
enacted legislation that would require states to centralize child
support disbursements. 62 One state-level entity would collect and
disburse all child support monies, whether obtained directly from
noncustodial parents or through wage withholding or other collection
techniques.63 The primary reason for this federal proposal was to
provide employers with a single location in each state to which they
could send income withholding payments. In addition, it was felt that
particular issue and play a dominant role in developing and implementing federal policy affecting that
issue. Entities within these networks conduct studies, analyze data, and engage experts in creative
thought concerning their issue, resulting in an extensive array of information to contribute to the
legislative process. See Bimber, supra note 58, at 601 (regarding legislators' reliance on lobbyists to
help them connect desired outcomes with specific policies).
62. Pub. L. No. 104-193, Tit. III § 312(b), 116 Stat. 2207, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 654(b)
(2000).
63. Id.
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centralization would make processing of payments more efficient and
economical, 64 and reduce the time required to get child support
checks into the hands of custodial parents.
The federally mandated system would displace varied state
methods for administering the collection and disbursement of these
funds-for instance, a number of states had at least some portion of
this function performed by county clerks of court. 65 These states had
established the clerk-administered system for reasons of
administrative efficiency 66 having to do with the court's role in
setting and modifying the amount of support and in certain
enforcement actions such as civil contempt proceedings. Some of
these states asserted that in their jurisdictions, the localized collection
and disbursement systems resulted in quicker receipt of support68by
the custodial parent 67 and fewer occurrences of unallocated funds.
The merits of the centralized disbursement proposal were not
nationally uniform. The costs and benefits would vary depending
upon factors such as the efficiency of alternative state systems, the
value of the judicial tie-in, the administrative and other costs of
changing from the current system to the new centralized system, and
the capacity of the state to develop and operate a system of the
64. JUNE GIBBS BROWN, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
STATE DISBURSEMENT UNITS: SHARING THE IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES OF SIX STATES 1 (2000)
[hereinafter OIG SDU RPT.].
65. See, e.g., FLA. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, RPT. No.
00-11, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNIT RAISES COST TO PROCESS CHILD SUPPORT
PAYMENTS 2 (2000) [hereinafter FLORIDA SDU RPT.].

66. See, e.g., id. at 4--6; Delegation Wants State Welfare Waiver, Writes HHS, WYOMING
DELEGATION: NEWS FROM CONGRESS (Aug. 19, 1999), http://thomas.senate.gov/htm/pr219.html
[hereinafter Delegation Wants State Waiver].
67. See, e.g., Affidavit of Jean Hoefer Toal, Chief Justice of South Carolina, in Joint Appendix Vol.
I at 333, Hodges v. Shalala, 311 F.3d 316 [hereinafter Toal aff.]; Delegation Says Child Support Money
2000),
10,
(March
FROM
CONGRESS
NEWS
DELEGATION:
WYOMING
Secured,
http://enzi.senate.gov/prdel3.htm.; OIG SDU RPT., supra note 64, at 3, 11.
68. Toal aff., supra note 67, at 333. Unallocated funds are child support monies that the child
support agency is unable to distribute to the payee because the payee or his/her location cannot be
identified, or for other reasons. As to problems in this area for states implementing the State
Disbursement Unit, see, e.g., OIG SDU RPT., supra note 64, at 21-23; Effects of the 1996 Welfare
Reform Law, Hearing Series on Welfare Reform Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
House Ways & Means Comm., 107th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-87 (2001) (statement of Geraldine Jensen,
President, Association for Children for Enforcement of Support, Inc.); and U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT: BETTER DATA AND MORE INFORMATION ON UNDISTRIBUTED
COLLECTIONS ARE NEEDED, Rpt. No. GAO-04-377 (2004).
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federally desired type. These matters varied considerably from one
state to another. In order to assess the viability and wisdom of the
proposal for his constituency, each representative would need
information from a variety of local sources such as the court system,
payors and payees of support, and the child support agency. And in
order to assess the viability and wisdom of the proposal for the
nation, Congress as a body would need information about the
differing costs and benefits of the program in the diverse legal,
governmental, and social environments of the fifty states to which the
requirement would apply. It is on an issue like this that the obstacles
to access and participation by local publics and their representatives
result in federal policies that may be seriously flawed when applied
to some or all states.69
The need for local information is most apparent when the
differences in local contexts, and hence local effects of a change in
the law, are tangible, as in the prior example. However, the same
issues arise when the local variations involve intangible issues of
morality, family life, and the integrating principles of local
communities. For instance, local norms concerning protection of the
family unit and the significance of biological versus social
relationships have resulted in differing state legal approaches to
70
determining the paternity of a child born to a married woman.
Without information about these variations and the rationales for
them, substantive rules concerning paternity determination adopted at
the national level would run a substantial risk of unnecessarily
disrupting important state family law policies.
2. Access to Local Information Related to Family Policy.
Congress rarely receives information from the family court judges,
clerks of court, attorneys, and other affected individuals who are
frequent communicants with their state legislatures on issues of
69. The Wyoming Congressional delegation noted this problem in complaining that "the state
disbursement unit adds up to a one-size-fits-all bureaucratic solution to a problem that doesn't exist in
our state." Delegation Wants State Waiver, supranote 66.
70. See infra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
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family law. These are the persons who can predict the effect of a
proposal on local institutions, law practice, community norms and
individual behavior. These also are the persons who can point out
pitfalls to effective implementation of a proposal at the local level
and suggest more workable alternatives. Their failure to provide this
information to Congress is primarily due to lack of awareness of the
details of proposed federal legislation, lack of access to Congress,
and the difficulty of having any effect on provisions of a pending bill.
3. Limitations on ConstituentAccess to Legislators and the
Legislative Process
Washington is less accessible than their state capitols for most
persons and interest groups who might wish to influence a piece of
legislation. The constituent lacks access to his or her representatives
as well as access to the legislative process itself-that is, a realistic
opportunity to present one's views to legislative bodies, particularly
committees and subcommittees, that are considering a bill. Public
participation in the process requires notice, physical access, and
openness of the proceedings to public comment. In all of these areas
the federal process is more difficult than the state process for the
average person to grasp and utilize.
Accessibility to one's representatives in Congress is lessened by
distance, by the greater competition for each representative's time,
and by the lack of informal contact opportunities with nonresident
representatives. A state representative is accessible to constituents
both in his official status and as a member of the represented
community. State legislators generally live and work in their districts,
even during the legislative session, making personal contact easy for
anyone wishing to express an opinion. Furthermore, being themselves
part of the community, these resident legislators are personally aware
of community events, norms, and practices.
Being a federal representative is a full-time job 7 1 in a location
distant from the constituencies of most representatives. Many
71. In recent years, the time commitment demanded by this ostensibly "full-time" job has decreased
dramatically. Whereas Congress was generally in session 323 days in the 1960s and 1970s, the average
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representatives own or rent a home in the Washington area, 72 and
return to their home districts on weekends and during Congressional
recesses. 73 Although this may add up to a substantial amount of time
in the district, it does not allow for the level of participation in
community life or informal interaction with constituents that is
available to state legislators in most states. Opportunities for formal
meetings are also more limited.
The difference in constituent access to state and federal legislators
is not simply a matter of physical proximity or availability. The
competetion for the legislator's time is far greater at the federal level
than at the state level-from the larger number of constituents, as
well as from sources of campaign funds 74 and national entities with
federal legislative interests.75 Schneier and Gross describe four levels
of constituent influence with legislators. Most influential are a small
core of 10-20 insiders. Next are persons and members of interest
groups on which the member can count for campaign contributions
and volunteer support. The third level is made up of persons within
broad partisan, geographical, demographic or other categories that
for 2000 through 2006 was estimated as less than 250. Norman Ornstein, Part-Time Congress, WASH.
POST,
Mar.
7,
2006,
at
A17,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/06/AR200603060161 1.html.
72. See RISMedia, New Members of Congress Seek Home Deals, Dec. 12, 2006,
http://rismedia.com/wp/2006-12-12/new-members-of-congress-seek-home-deals (last visited Oct. 9,
2008).
73. Ornstein, supra note 71.
74. The larger the representative's electoral district and the more constituents he or she represents,
the greater will be the role of money in conducting a re-election campaign. These representatives will
allocate much of their available access to potential sources of campaign funds, which are generally
entities with substantial interests in federally regulated matters. SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 56, at
42-45.
75. At the most basic level, each federal representative has a much larger number of constituents
than his state counterparts. Each member of the U.S. House of Representatives represents approximately
647,000 voters. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2000: CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT, www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/apportionment.html (last visited July
18, 2008). By way of example, the constituencies of state representatives in New York are 127,000, and
in Nevada, 48,000, while in these same states, senate constituencies are 306,000 and 95,000,
respectively. New York State Task Force on Demographic Research & Reapportionment, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://latfor.state.ny.us/faqs/; Nevada Legislature, Summary of 2001 Redistricting
Legislation, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/researchlredistreapplntro.cfm.
United States Senators
represent an entire state, with voting age populations from 495,304 in Montana to 33,871,648 in
California. The larger the number of constituents, the more competition for the representative's time and
the less likelihood that the representative will be able to meet or talk personally with any given
constituent.
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generally vote in favor of the member. Finally, the fourth group
includes the entire voting population of the member's district. The
member's attention is generally distributed among constituents
according to their rank in this hierarchy. 76 As noted by Schneier and
Gross, members of Congress must give audience to a wide range of
individuals whom they cannot afford to offend, even if those
individuals can provide little in the way of useful information or
77
perspective.
4. Local Preferencesvs. Local Information
Of course, legislators themselves seek out and are responsive to
public preferences on high-profile issues, and sometimes other issues
as well.78 However, public preferences, about which legislators are
most aware, are distinguishable from publicly proffered information
in two important ways. Public preferences relate to policy directions,
and reflect individual opinions-whether informed or uninformed.
Information, on the other hand, describes the factual context upon
which proposed legislation would operate. Information, of course,
often comes to the legislator accompanied by an opinion about how
the factual context would be affected by the legislation and whether
that would be a good or bad thing. However, the informational part of
the communication enables the legislator to assess how the legislation
will affect his constituents and their communities, 79 rather than what
they think of the idea or philosophy reflected in the legislation.
Further, public preferences are most likely to be framed in relation
to general issues-such as, "Should Congress pass legislation to
assure that noncustodial parents ('deadbeat dads') support their
76. SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 56, at 40-42.
77. Id.at 74.
78. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Page et al., Constituency, Party, andRepresentation in Congress,48 PUB.
OPINION Q. 741, 753 (1984) (report of a study finding a strong correspondence between congressmen's
roll call votes and the policy preferences of their constituents on social welfare issues, though less strong
on other issues such as "law and order").
79. Bimber, supra note 58, at 597. Bimber notes that members often know what outcomes their
constituents desire, but are uncertain about what policies will produce the right outcome. Id at 600.
Indeed, "reducing [legislators'] uncertainty about the consequences of legislation can be a significant
source of persuasion and influence for lobbyists and interest groups." Richard A. Smith, Interest Group
Influence in the US. Congress,XX LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 89, 99 (1995).
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children?" The general public is less likely to be informed about, or
have opinions concerning, the specific mechanisms by which
proposed legislation would implement the new policy direction,
much less the effect of specific legislative provisions on the
principles and processes of family law in their locality.
It is not public opinion that is particularly lacking in federal
legislative processes, but rather information related to the effects of
specific legislative provisions on families and individuals, on court
systems, on communities and community norms. Indeed, in one study
legislators cited the difficulty in assessing the impact on their districts
8
of proposed legislation as their most vexing informational problem. 0
Cooper and McKenzie distinguish among several categories of
information used by legislators: factual information about
circumstances and conditions, empirical information related to
outcomes of policy choices, knowledge of analytical methods, and
information about attitudes and preferences. 8 1 It is only the latter
category that is commonly received from the legislator's
constituency.
5. Shortcomings of NationalSpokesmen for Local Interests
The relative scarcity of opportunities for direct participation of
local publics in setting federal legislative agendas and shaping the
content of federal legislation magnifies the role of interest groups that
purport to represent public perspectives on various issues. Although
some of the advocacy groups that are most influential on social
policy lack a direct grass roots connection,82 others have close links
to local publics because they are either national membership
organizations or associations of state or local organizations. In
theory, at least, these latter groups should be able to assimilate and
bring before Congress the perspectives of their local members. There
80. Arthur G. Stevens, Jr., et al., U.S. Congressional Structure and Representation: The Role of
Informal Groups, VI LEGIS. STUD. Q. 415, 420 (1981).
81. Bimber, supra note 58, at 592 (citing THE HOUSE AT WORK (Joseph Cooper & G. Calvin
Mackenzie, eds., 1981)).
82. See Hugh Heclo, The Politics of Welfare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 169, 189
(Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins, eds., 2001).
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are two problems with this theory. First, national organizations
develop perspectives and interests of their own, distinct from those of
their members. They tend to have a preference for congressional
rather than state action because of the comparative ease of lobbying
one legislature rather than fifty. Their staffs are based in Washington
and often have previous experience as congressional members or
staff, and they look at problems and their solutions through the same
eyes as other Washington insiders.8 3
Further, assimilation of the perspectives of their membershipwhich may be quite diverse-necessarily results in setting aside or
minimizing the interests of some members in order to develop a
single "consensus" position for the organization as a whole. It is
common, for instance, for policy positions to more closely reflect the
preferences of larger, wealthier, and hence more influential states
than those of smaller and poorer states.
D. Local Representatives' Limited Ability to Affect Legislative
Provisions
The primary voices in Congress for local interests are the elected
representatives from each area. Madison envisioned Congress as a
body capable of fashioning uniform laws for the nation as a whole
despite the diversity of interests and circumstances among the states,
because representatives knowledgeable about the interests and
84
circumstances in each state would be participating in each decision.
As previously noted, the presumption that local representatives bring
local knowledge to the table has not been fully borne out in practice.
More importantly, only a small fraction of the local representatives
are even present at the table when the most important decisions about
national policy initiatives are being made. Thus, the ability of any
legislator to serve as a voice for local needs and concerns within the
federal legislative process is limited by the constraints on the
legislator's own access to the process.

83. SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 56, at 81-82.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 56 (James Madison).
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Because of the number and complexity of the issues that come
before Congress, it is able to function only by dividing its workload
into manageable segments over which subgroups of the membership
are given primary authority. This is the concept underlying the
committee system in every American legislature. Each member is
expected to specialize in the policy areas of the committees to which
he or she is assigned, and the other members rely heavily on these
specialists for information, advice, and representation on issues and
legislation considered by the committee. 85
Because most of the substantive evolution of a piece of legislation
takes place within committees and subcommittees, 86 a member's
ability to influence the content of a bill is heavily dependent on his or
her membership on the committee responsible for the bill. 87 Within
the committee, he or she has voting power, negotiating clout, and
credibility. Hall notes that "[s]ignificant influence over the substance
of a bill seldom comes without involvement in such activities as
88
writing, negotiating, and building support for its major provisions,"
and these are functions of committee and subcommittee
membership.89
The ability to influence the shape of a bill from outside the
committee is dependent upon such factors as relationships, common
interests, or bargaining chips that can be used to obtain the support of
a committee member. Moreover, the considerable demands on a
legislator's time, energy, and legislative resources limit the
legislator's ability and desire to become involved in legislation
outside his or her own areas of responsibility.9" "We may come here
with deep interests in subjects unrelated to our committee," said one
legislator, "but we are so busy there that we never get around to
85. Herbert B. Asher, Committees and the Norm of Specialization, ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sc., Jan. 1974, at 63, 64-66; see also Zwier, supra note 56, at 35-37.
86. See, e.g., SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 56, at 175-76.
87. See generally Richard L. Hall, Participationand Purpose in Committee Decision Making, 81
AM. POL. SC. REV. 105, 106-07 (1987).
88. Id. at 116-17.
89. See id. at 112; SCHNEIER & GROSS, supra note 56, at 81-82 (committee members as part of
policy subsystems that dominate drafting and negotiation on bills).
90. Cf. Hall, supra note 87, at 108-09 (effect of multiple demands on legislator's activity within his
or her own committee).
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thinking through or drafting legislation covering other matters.... So
we begin to concentrate on the committee on which we serve even
9
though our interest may not lie there." '
There is at least a theoretical possibility that any member can
precipitate amendment of a bill on the House or Senate floor after it
leaves committee. However, there are substantial practical and
procedural obstacles to passage of a floor amendment. Not least of
these is the frequency with which both House and Senate adopt rules
that limit or prohibit floor amendments to a particular bill.92 When
floor amendments are allowed, the committee chair exerts
considerable control over which amendments are taken up and what
type of reception they receive. 93 Rarely is a floor amendment adopted
that substantially alters the main provisions of the committee bill.
E. CongressionalInability to Accommodate Local Difference
Even if Congress possessed perfect information about local
differences, congressional mandates are ill-suited to accommodating
those differences, whether they are tangible-as in the centralized
disbursement example--or the intangible differences so often
involved in family policy. Congressional enactments tend to be
uniform for all affected individuals, states, or other entities. Indeed,
constitutional parameters and practical difficulties limit Congress'
ability to act otherwise. Thus, it is inevitable that federal legislation
affecting issues subject to local diversity will be incompatible with
conditions in at least some localities.
Issues raised by local diversity can be avoided by allowing the
states flexibility to tailor their approaches to achieving a federal goal,
as was largely the approach taken to welfare reform with the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant.
However, if Congress mandates a rule or approach for all states, or
91. CHARLES L. CLAPP, THE CONGRESSMAN 124 (1964).
92. One study in the late 1980's found that fewer than one in seven House bills was subject to
amendment STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 18
(1989). Floor amendments are viewed by many as a vehicle for the poorly informed to vitiate wellresearched legislation. Bimber, supra note 58, at 598-99.
93. SCHNEIER& GROSS, supranote 56, at 184-85.
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significantly limits the parameters for state flexibility, then choices
must be made. These choices may reflect a congressional preference
distinct from the preference of any state, or they may involve
compromising or prioritizing the interests of states with different
preferences. Unless the preferences of Congress and all the states are
the same, the preferences of at least some states will not be reflected
in the Congressional enactment. Similarly, if local contexts affected
by the legislation differ, the approach adopted is likely to be
inappropriate to at least some of these local contexts. In either case,
this means that in at least some states the legislation will have
disruptive effects not necessary to accomplishing the federal goal,
and which may even impede accomplishment of the congressional
objectives.
The institutional factors outlined above highlight three problems
that arise when Congress legislates on traditionally local issues.
Congress lacks its own institutional expertise in these areas, and
hence is likely to overlook important consequences and disruptions
that may result from provisions of the legislation. This information is
unlikely to enter the federal legislative process through the
participation of individuals or groups knowledgeable about local
perspectives. It is not at all certain to come to the attention even of
the local representatives in Congress; and if it does, they may have
little ability to affect the legislative product. Finally, the uniformity of
federal legislation makes it impossible for a specific federal mandate
to accommodate local differences, even if known.
IV. EXAMPLES FROM FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT LAW

Federal child support enforcement statutes provide numerous
examples of how these limitations lead to unintended and undesired
effects on local family laws and policies. The federal focus in
enacting child support enforcement legislation was on creating a
relentlessly effective system for collecting as much child support as
possible from absent parents. The system adopted is, in general, well
designed for achieving this purpose; however, it does so at the
expense of a number of long-standing state policies on issues ranging
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from families to court procedure to privacy. The collateral effects of
two specific provisions of this expansive federal mandate are
examined below.
A. Retroactive Modification of Support
In 1986 Congress enacted a provision known as the Bradley
Amendment, 94 which prohibited retroactive modification of child
support awards. 95 According to its sponsor, Senator Bill Bradley, the
prohibition on retroactive modification was aimed at preventing "the
practice of a noncustodial parent moving to another State, allowing a
substantial debt to his or her child to pile up, and assuming that there
will be a retroactive modification of the original order that
substantially reduces or totally dismisses the debt." 96 The provision
thus was aimed at parents who might employ a friendly out-of-state
court as a mechanism for willfully avoiding their child support
obligation. However, the provision has had the unintended effect of
perpetuating a huge backlog of unwarranted, uncollectible, and
unchangeable child support arrearages resulting from missteps in
applying the child support guidelines and other aspects of the system
to low-income parents.
The federal child support legislation, of which the Bradley
Amendment was a part, targeted the fathers of children receiving
welfare benefits. As such, the resulting system reached a vast
population of low-income fathers with substantially different social
and economic characteristics from the largely middle-class divorced
94. Pub L.No.99-509, § 9103, 100 Stat. 1873 (codified as 24 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (2000)).
95. Id.("[Elach State must have in effect laws requiring... [p]rocedures which require that any
payment or installment of support under any child support order, whether ordered through the State
judicial system or through the expedited processes required by [this section], is (on and after the date it
is due)... (C) not subject to retroactive modification by such State or by any other State; except that
such procedures may permit modification with respect to any period during which there is pending a
The Bradley Amendment also required state laws making unpaid child
petition for modification .. ").
This provision
support a judgment by operation of law, entitled to fill faith and credit in every state. Id.
addressed a significant obstacle to interstate enforcement of child support arrearages: the necessity in
many states of a proceeding to reduce the arrearage to a money judgment in the state of origin before it
could be enforced in the second state. The Bradley Amendment obviated the need for this costly and
time-consuming step. MARILYN RAY SMITH ET AL., MASSACHUSET-rS DIVORCE LAW PRACTICE

MANuAL § 10.18 (2003).
96. 132 CONG. REC., S5303-04 (daily ed. May 5, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bradley).

HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 425 2008-2009

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:2

fathers who had previously dominated the population of child support
obligors. 97 It was predictable that the influx of low-income obligors
would raise new issues due to variations in their employment patterns
and the difficulty of supporting two households with one poverty or
near poverty-level income. Indeed, overzealousness in setting the
amount of child support awards against indigent parents has resulted
in the accrual of large arrearages by persons who have no means of
98
ever being able to pay them.
At the same time that this new population of indigent parents was
being added to the program, the states were being mandated to implement "revolutionary" 99 changes in the program itself. Federal law
required numerous changes in state law and significant reallocations
of state governmental authority from the judicial to the executive
branch. With changes of this magnitude, it was to be expected that
post-implementation adjustments would be needed to correct
inefficiencies and eliminate unintended adverse effects of the new
system. Where those inefficiencies and unintended adverse effects
have resulted in excessive child support awards against individual
obligors-as in the case of many indigent parents--courts asked to
enforce the awards need flexibility to avoid inequities, due process
violations, and counterproductive outcomes. The Bradley
Amendment not only ignored the likely potential for unintended
97. See David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues and Perils of ChildSupport Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2596 (1995).
98. E.g., JUNE GIBBS BROWN, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE POLICIES USED TO
ESTABLISH CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS FOR LOW INCOME NoN-CUSTODIAL PARENTS (2000). In fact, it is
common for child support obligors to accrue large arrearages that do not reflect either the obligor's
economic circumstances or his unwillingness to pay. Total arrearages owed by child support obligors in
2003 approached $100 billion, in 10,775,030 child support cases. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT
ENFORCEMENT, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FY 2003 PRELIMINARY DATA REPORT 3 & TABLE 13

(2004), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/progms/cse/pubs/2004/reprts/preliminarydata/. By way of
comparison, $21.2 billion in child support was collected during that year. Id.at 2. Collections in
arrearage cases averaged $600, compared with an average $9,000 arrearage per case. Id. "The
percentage of non-payors was greatest in the low-income tier." JANET REHNQUIST, U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN ON TANF 2 (2002). In 1998 about fifty

percent of non-custodial parents in the child support enforcement system had earnings below the poverty
line. Id. at i, 6. In a 2002 report, HHS's Office of the Inspector General concluded that the delinquency
of sixty percent of low-income nonpayors is attributable to "income levels, employment history,
education levels and rates of institutionalization" rather than unwillingness to pay. Id. at 2.
99. Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996
Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 561 (1996).
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consequences of the changes occurring in the system; it magnified
those consequences by foreclosing the possibility of post hoc
amelioration.
The problem of unintended consequences is a familiar one for all
legislative bodies. It is difficult even in the best of circumstances for
legislators to foresee and accommodate all the situations to which a
particular legislative rule might be applied. Congress was unlikely to
perceive the potential harms of a broad provision such as the Bradley
Amendment not only because of its lack of family law expertise and
information, but also because it has tended to view child support
enforcement legislation through the lens of debt collection. From that
perspective, the prohibition on retroactive modification appeared to
be a simple and unremarkable statement that an accrued debt cannot
be judicially extinguished. From the perspective of family law,
however, retroactive modification of support would be viewed as a
tool for assuring economic justice for members of divided families.
Prior to being foreclosed by the Bradley Amendment, a number of
states believed there were circumstances in which equity demanded
00
that some or all of an obligor's accrued child support be forgiven.'
The effects on individuals, both obligors and their children, and on
family policy of closing off state options in this area have been pronounced. Attempts to collect arrearages drive obligors
underground, 1 1 separate children from their fathers, 10 2 and impede
100. Eighteen states either explicitly or implicitly permitted retroactive modification of support in
1986. 54 Fed. Reg. 15,758 (Apr. 19, 1989); Comment, An Unfortunate Change of Circumstances:
Wisconsin ProhibitsRetroactive Revision of Child Support Orders, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 1123, 1127 &
n.26 (1988) (listing states) [hereinafter An Unfortunate Change]. It is quite likely that additional states
would have expressly adopted this position as the problem of indigents with excessive arrearages
became widespread in the 1990s. States allowing retroactive modification typically coupled this relief
with prospective modification, e.g., Kelzenberg v. Kelzenberg, 352 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (quoting then current Minnesota statute), on grounds such as the obligor's disability, e.g., Carlson
v. Carlson, 303 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981), incarceration, e.g., Dickenson v. Dickenson, No. C295-585, 1995 WL 507596, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1995); cf Santa Clara County v. Wilson, 4
Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing trial court's forgiveness of arrears), or reduced
income. E.g., Kelzenberg, 352 N.W.2d at 847; Looyen v. Martinson, 390 N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986); see An Unfortunate Change, supra,at 1124 n.6. A number of states, many of which had not
previously permitted retroactive modification, currently allow forgiveness of arrearages owed to the
state in certain circumstances. See Esther Ann Griswold & Jessica Pearson, New Approaches to Child
SupportArrears, POL'Y & PRAC. OF PUB. HUMAN SERVS., Sept. 1, 2001, at 18.
101. See MAUREEN WALLER & ROBERT PLOTNICK, CHILD SUPPORT AND LOW-INCOME FAMILIES:
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efforts to improve the earning power of low-income parents.' 0 3
Despite the problems, which are widely recognized at the state level
and by the federal agency that oversees state child support programs,
the Bradley Amendment remains on the books more than 20 years
04
after its enactment. 1
B. Defining Paternity
The issue of paternity establishment provides another cogent
example of the problems that can arise when federal legislation enters
the realm of family law. Congress' interest in paternity establishment
arose from the need to identify fathers of the 36.9% of children born
out of wedlock 10 5 in order that child support could be ordered and
collected. This interest coincided with advances in genetic
technology that made it possible to establish with 98% probability
that a particular man had fathered a certain child. Congress saw this
technology as obviating the need for the complex judicial
proceedings used by the states to establish paternity, perceiving that
PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES, AND POLICY 42, 44 (1999), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/

report/R- 1199MWR.pdf.
102. See Griswold & Pearson, supra note 100, at 34-35; Chambers, supra note 97, at 2597.
103. In addition, states are expending vast amounts of resources in futile efforts to collect arrearages
from obligors who will never be able to pay.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (2000). The federal agency that administers the child support enforcement
program is itself encouraging states not only to modify systemic mechanisms that lead to non-willful
accrual of arrearages, but also to forgive the state share of accrued arrearages in certain circumstances.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, MANAGING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS, A
DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK: SUMMARY OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES RO I, 11
& III THIRD MEETING ON MANAGING ARREARS 10-13 (2003), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/arrears/; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, POLICY
INTERPRETATION QUESTION 99-03 (1999), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/PIQ/1999/piq9903.htm (last visited July 21, 2008); OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, POLICY
INTERPRETATION QUESTION 00-03 (2000), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/PIQ/2000/piq-O003.htm (last visited July 21, 2008). An original purpose of the federal child support enforcement
program was to repay the state and federal governments for welfare benefits received by the payor's
family. Collections received on behalf of children for whom TANF benefits are being or (in the case of
arrearages) were paid are divided between the state and federal governments. See 42 U.S.C. § 657
(2000). The Department of Health and Human Services has interpreted the law to allow states to accept
less that the full payment of child support arrearages under certain circumstances. OFFICE OF CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, POLICY INTERPRETATION QUESTION 99-03 (1999), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cse/pol/PIQ/1999/piq-9903.htm (last visited July 21, 2008).
105. CDC National Center for Health Statistics, FASTATS: Unmarried Childbearing (2005),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm (last visited July 18, 2008).
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paternity establishment could now be simply a matter of science
rather than law. Consequently, in the Family Support Act of 1988
(FSA-88),106 Congress mandated that states accepting federal welfare
funds expedite proceedings for paternity establishment by enacting
procedures that would require genetic tests in contested paternity
actions if requested by any party. 107 Implicit in this provision was the
intent that paternity be based on genetics, and it was generally so
08
interpreted.1
No particular attention was given to the genetic testing provision
during congressional consideration of FSA-88. From the perspective
of the federal interest in child support collections, this provision was
merely a logical and scientifically valid step in the important process
of establishing a legal father for every child. There is no indication
that Congress desired to override a longstanding family law rule
presuming that a child born to a married woman is the legal offspring
of her husband (the presumption of marital paternity). Rather, it
appears that Congress was simply unaware of this rule, which was
not a part of the child support enforcement dialogue at that time and
hence not a part of the information brought to Congress's attention
through its normal information networks.
In 1988 most, if not all, states recognized the presumption of
10 9
marital paternity, said to be "one of the strongest known to law."'
This presumption was not simply a product of the difficulty of
proving paternity in the pre-genetic testing age. It also reflected
important social policies. The presumption, together with collateral
rules that limited the filing of paternity actions and the evidence that
could be offered,110 protected the integrity and privacy of the family
106. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 11 1(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
107. FSA-88 added to the state plan requirements codified in 42 U.S.C. § 666 that states must have in
effedt "procedures under which the State is required... to require the child and all other parties, in a
contested paternity case, to submit to genetic tests upon the request of any such party." Id.
108. See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the
Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 217-18 (2002).
109. John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1990) (citing Cairgle v. Am. Radiator Standard
Corp., 7 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1951)); In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 335 (Kan. 1989); Chandler v.
Merrell, 353 S.E.2d 133, 134 (S.C. 1987).
110. These rules strictly limited the persons who had standing to raise the issue of the paternity of a
marital child, see generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Who May Dispute Presumption of
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unit. 11 Of particular importance from the perspective of current
family policy, the presumption also protected the child's interest in
his relationship with the man he believed to be his father.' 12 The
presumption thus gave social paternity and family integrity priority
over biological paternity." 3 This choice was reversed without
deliberation or debate by the federal statute.
The impact on family policy of rejecting the presumption of
marital paternity was summarized by one commentator as follows:
Quite suddenly, based on the results of genetic testing, men who
are outside the legal family structure will gain rights and
responsibilities toward one or more of the children in that family,
men who unknowingly established loving relationships with their
wives children will become legal strangers to those children, and
children will lose the only father they have ever known, often
Legitimacy of Child Conceived or Born During Wedlock, 90 A.L.R.3D 1032 (1979), and prohibited the
mother and father from providing testimony that would bastardize the child. "Lord Mansfield's Rule,"
originally enunciated as dictum in Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777) (K.B. stated that
"decency, morality, and policy [required] that [a couple] shall not be permitted to say, that they have no
connection, and therefore that their offspring is spurious." Id. This rule was generally adopted in the
American colonies, though in recent times restrictions on testimony by the married couple have been
significantly relaxed. E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989).
111. See id. The presumption and rules were based on a recognition that judicial inquiries into the
child's paternity would themselves be destructive of family integrity and privacy, regardless of the
outcome. See id; Carl E. Schneider, The ChannelingFunction in FamilyLaw, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 495,
526-28 (1992).
112. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125; Ross, 783 P.2d at 338; M.F. v. N.H., 599 A.2d 1297, 1300-02
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1991); Schneider, supra note 11, at 526-28 (describing practical and symbolic
objectives underlying the presumption of marital paternity).
113. State courts and legislatures and family law scholars were in the process of re-evaluating use of
the presumption in light of the availability of highly accurate genetic tests. Rather than giving absolute
priority to either biological or social paternity, most sought to balance the two. Many developed nuanced
approaches that took into consideration circumstances such as the child's age, seeing this as an indicator
of the importance of the paternal relationship to the child. See Ira Mark Elman, Thinking About Custody
and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36 FAM. L.Q. 49, 56-65 (2002). See also Smith v. Cole,
553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989) (in state with very rigid marital presumption, recognizing "dual paternity" in
order to impose support and other obligations on biological father with strong relationship with child).
Others left it to judicial discretion to determine whether genetic testing was appropriate and when the
presumption should be overridden. E.g., Ross, 783 P.2d at 338-39 (as modified 1990) (applying KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1118); John M, 571 A.2d at 1384-86, 1388 (1989) (applying 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6133); Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 870-71 (1989) (applying W. VA. CODE §
48A-6-3).; C.C. v. A.C., 406 Mass. 679, 550 N.E.2d 365 (1990) (abolishing presumption of legitimacy,
but requiring preliminary hearing to determine extent of relationship between putative father and child
before allowing action to go forward).
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with little hope of establishing a father-child relationship with
another man." 14
Any notion that such situations would be infrequent is precluded
by the disturbing commonality of "paternity disestablishment" suits
in which a divorcing father seeks to prove that he is not the genetic
father of a marital child in order to avoid paying child support. 115 In

addition to the psycho-social effects on the child and family, these
claims undermine achievement of the goals of the child support
enforcement program itself. It was not until the federal Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) solicited comments on its
proposed regulations to implement FSA-88 that the conflict with the
presumption of marital paternity came to federal attention. 116 HIS

amended the final rule to eliminate the conflict. 117 However, this
regulatory interpretation was not issued until May 15, 1991, three
years after enactment of the statute and one and one-half years after
the deadline for states to bring their laws into compliance with the
genetic testing requirement. 118 As a result of inertia, inattention and
confusion at the state level, the law of some states continues to reflect
the mandate of the proposed regulation despite apparently contrary
state policy preferences.119
These two examples illustrate the unintended social consequences
that can arise when Congress undertakes to establish national rules in
areas that are inherently local in nature and with which Congress is
114. Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 551-52 (2000); see also Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 108, at
218 (discussing effects on societal conceptions of fatherhood).
115. See, e.g., Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II Questioning the Paternity of Marital
Children,http://www.clasp.org/publications. These suits may also be filed by a putative biological father
who wishes to establish a relationship with the child, see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110 (1989), or by a
divorced mother contesting custody, see Sleeper v. Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028, 1029-30 (Oregon Ct. App.
1997), or desiring to establish her second husband as the child's biological father, see Stitham v.
Henderson, 768 A.2d 598, 600 (Me. 2001).
116. See 56 Fed. Reg. 22,350 (May 15, 1991) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 303.5(d)(2) (2007)).
117. Id. at 22,335, 22,350, 22,354. HHS adopted a regulation limiting the genetic testing requirement
to actions "in which the issue of paternity may be raised under State law." Id
118. Id. at 22,335. This interpretation was later codified by the Personal Responsibility & Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 331, 110 Stat. 210 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
666(a)(5)(B)(i)).
119. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-954 (Cur. Supp. 2007).
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unfamiliar. Both the Bradley Amendment and the genetic testing
mandate started with a legitimate federal concern: the interstate
enforcement of child support orders in one case, and increasing child
support collections from unwed fathers in the other. In each case,
however, the congressional remedy was both too broad and too
prescriptive, given the enhanced potential for unanticipated
consequences.
CONCLUSION

The above discussion of Congress' shortcomings as a source of
family law rules and the type of problems that can result from federal
legislation affecting family law is not an indictment of congressional
policy-setting on social issues. Congress possesses the capacity to
identify pressing social problems of national import and to move
them to the forefront of the policy agenda throughout the nation. The
interest groups, think tanks, and governmental entities that form the
national policy networks on which Congress relies possess research
and analytical capacities that enable them to conduct studies, marshal
information,
analyze
trends,
and
make
research-based
recommendations. In some instances, significant policy tools are
0
within the exclusive control of Congress.12
Federal administrators can point to data demonstrating the
accomplishments of federally legislated programs such as child
support enforcement and child protection, and many persons might
see these benefits as clearly sufficient to outweigh some disruption of
state family policy. I believe they are wrong for two reasons. First,
disruption of state family law is rarely necessary in order to achieve
federal objectives. Conditions on federal grants can generally be
structured to leave the state sufficient flexibility to achieve
congressional objectives in nondisruptive ways. Indeed, many federal
grant conditions are structured in this fashion. If Congress is

120. In regard to child support enforcement, for instance, effective tools for locating absent parents,
transcending jurisdictional barriers in interstate cases, and locating and seizing assets could only have
been created at the federal level.
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scrupulous in structuring conditions affecting family law and policy
to assure that adequate flexibility remains to accommodate local
laws, practices, and social norms, it should be possible to achieve
both state and federal objectives while retaining the coherent body of
family law in each state.
The second reason is that the effects of disrupting state family
policy are broad and subtle and may emerge as serious social
problems as the impact of the legal change echoes through society.
Family roles and values are affected by a complex amalgamation of
cultural, economic, and legal forces. A change in family policy can
affect these interacting forces in unanticipated ways even when
carefully crafted within the context and with a full understanding of
state laws relating to the family. The state of our knowledge about the
long-term effects of changes in family policy, as Mary Ann Glendon
has pointed out, is primitive. 12 1 At a time when the family is subject
to many destabilizing pressures, we should be very cautious about
legal changes at the national level that override or ignore local
differences and squelch experimentation.
Although the Supreme Court has rejected moral bases for limiting
private conduct and choice, it continues to affirm the importance of
the state's interest in the moral environment of the community as a
whole, 122 acknowledging the states' right "to maintain a decent
society." 123 This distinction drawn by the Supreme Court indicates
that community morality, order, and cohesion continue to be valued
by the Supreme Court and the legal system generally, as they are by
social scientists. These values that traditionally have been the
rationale for local control of family policy are not obsolete despite
the expansion of federal power and inclination to venture into this
area, and disruption of community norms and practices relating to
121. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1, 134
(1991).

122. E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co.
of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); see City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (both bringing community decency factors in through a "secondary
effects" analysis); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
123. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (quoted in Pais,413
U.S. at 59, 69 (1973)).
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families is a serious byproduct of overly prescriptive federal family
law initiatives.
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